This paper analyses the direction and degree of labour reform in Chile since the reestablishment of the democratic regime in 1990, sixteen years after the 1973 coup d ' e t a t that installed General Augusto Pinochet in power. The military regime (1973)(1974)(1975)(1976)(1977)(1978)(1979)(1980)(1981)(1982)(1983)(1984)(1985)(1986)(1987)(1988)(1989)) adopted a highly repressive political character and implemented neo-liberal economic policies, which together with the institutional restructuring that accompanied them, transformed vast sectors of Chilean society. The 1979 Labour Plan significantly changed the character of industrial relations legislation and the roles and balance of power among social actors, transforming the way in which industrial relations had been conducted since the 1920s. We argue that despite more than a decade since the recovery of democracy, and after several reform initiatives, the current legislation presents remarkable continuity with the one enacted under authoritarianism, contradicting claims that profound change has been achieved. In attempting to explain the direction and degree of the Transition' s L a b o u r R e f o r ms , we emphasise the importance of political-economy approaches. We explore the conservative nature of the Chilean transition to democracy, the continuity of the neoliberal economic model, and the increasing imbalance of power between capital and labour, in an effort to account for the persistence of the authoritarian legacy in t o d a y ' s C h i l e a n i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s s y s t e m.
Introduction
Industrial relations systems bear the works of their historical, political, legal, economic, and social contexts. The modification of any of these variables changes the way industrial relations are conducted and this may happen either gradually or abruptly (Bronstein, 1995) . In the past 30 years, the context of the Chilean industrial relations system has undergone significant political and economic change. In 1973, a
c o u p d ' e t a t led by General Augusto Pinochet terminated a long-established democratic tradition by aborting the Constitutional government of President
Salvador Allende (1970 Allende ( -1973 . Since the beginning, the military regime (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) adopted a highly repressive character and implemented neo-liberal economic policies, which together with the institutional restructuring that accompanied them, transformed vast sectors of Chilean society including the way in which industrial relations had been conducted since the late 1920s. In 1979, the military enacted the so-called Labour Plan that significantly changed the character of legislation, and with it the roles and balance of power among the social actors. In 1990, after sixteen years in power, Pinochet left office and a centre-left coalition backed by the labour movement took over. At the outset of the process of transition to democracy major reforms to the labour legislation were in the agenda. Several laws were passed in the early 1990s, a new Labour Code was issued in 1994 and further reforms were passed in 2001. This paper analyses the content and the degree of the main changes that the Chilean i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s ' l e g a l f r a me wo r k h a s e x p e r i e n c e d u n d e r the democratic regime.
We argue that despite more than a decade since the recovery of democracy, the IJHRM 4 current legislation presents remarkable continuity with the one inherited from
P i n o c h e t ' s d i c t a t o r s h i p . Al t h o u g h i t i s n o t t h e p u r p o s e o f t h i s p a p e r t o d e v elop a
legal analysis of the reforms, it focuses on labour law because in Chile legislation has been historically the main means for introducing change in industrial relations.
I n a d d i t i o n , ' c h a n g e s i n t h e l a w ( …) p r o v i d e a g o o d i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e n a t u r e o f change (and also), the negotiation and conflict that surround efforts to revise the l a b o u r l a w r e f l e c t a s t r u g g l e t o r e d e f i n e t h e k e y i n s t i t u t i o n s o f i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s ' (Cook, 1998: 312) . Chile is an important case in the study of the effects of neoliberal political and economic restructuring in Latin America as it was the first country that introduced such policies in the mid and late 1970s (Riethof, 1999) and since its approach closely resembles the one recommended by the international financial institutions to other developing countries (Schurman, 2001 ). This paper is divided in three parts. The first part explains the political and economic l e g a c y o f P i n o c h e t ' s d i c t a t o r s h i p , a n d p r e s e n t s i t s i mp l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e i n d u s t r i a l relations legal framework enacted during military rule. The second part discusses the direction and degree of labour law changes undertaken by the democratic governments. The third part argues for the importance of political-economy approaches in explaining labour reform. It explores the conservative nature of the Chilean transition to democracy, the continuity of the neo-liberal economic model, and the increasing imbalance of power among social actors, in attempting to account for the persistence of the authoritarian legacy in toda y ' s C h i l e a n i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s system.
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The legacy of the dictatorship (1973-1 9 8 9 ) : ' p r o t e c t e d d e mo c r a c y ' , n e o -liberalism, and the 1979 Labour Plan
It is widely acknowledged that since the c o u p d ' e t a t of 1973 Chilean society has been transformed in political, economic, and social terms. Furthermore, the transformations commenced during the course of authoritarian rule (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) ' h a v e c o me t o b e s e e n a s o n e o f t h e mo s t i n t e r n a l l y c o n s i s t e n t a n d c o mp r e h e n s i v e neo-liberal developmental models in the world ' ( Ku r t z , 1 9 9 9 : 3 9 9 ) . I n t h i s s e c t i o n we briefly examine the legacy of sixteen years of authoritarianism for the transformation of the industrial relations system through what Kurtz (1999) considers to have been the two overarching goals addressed by the military regime: political restructuring and economic stabilisation. We also present schematically the main features of the 1979 Labour Plan.
P o l i t i c a l r e p r e s s i o n a n d t h e mo d e l o f ' p r o t e c t e d d e mo c r a c y '
A year after the c o u p d ' e t a t , in 1974, the military junta proclaimed in its ' De c l a r a t i o n o f P r i n c i p l e s o f t h e Go v e r n me n t o f C h i l e ' t h a t i t d i d n o t ' i n t e n d t o b e a me r e c a r e t a k e r ' a n d t h a t i n s t e a d i t wo u l d ' t a k e u p o n i t s e l f t h e h i s t o r i c mi s s i o n o f
giving Chile new governmental institutions that embody the profound changes o c c u r r i n g i n mo d e r n t i me s ' ( c i t e d i n C o l l i n s a n d L e a r , 1 9 9 5 : 2 7 ) . Ho we v e r , i n o r d e r to achieve this long-t e r m o b j e c t i v e , t h e mi l i t a r y p r o c e e d e d f i r s t t o ' s t a b i l i s e ' t h e country, which meant in practice the open repression of the Left and the dismantling o f t h e ' d a n g e r o u s ' ' r e p r e s e n t a
t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t h a d a l l o we d C h i l e t o b e c o me t h e f i r s t n a t i o n i n t h e wo r l d t o e l e c t a Ma r x i s t h e a d o f s t a t e ' ( R o
e r t s , 1 9 9 8 : 9 4 ) . T h u s , IJHRM 7 on setting limits to the exercise of popular sovereignty by the democratic majority.
Consequently, it established the constitutional proscription of Marxist parties and prevented union members to hold party affiliations; set up the existence of influential non-representative institutions such as the National Security Council and a Supreme Court nominated by the military; and, created a future political representation system that would confer veto power to minority elites and to the military through designated lifetime Senators. In relation to industrial relations, the model of ' p r o t e c t e d d e mo c r a c y ' a i me d t o e l i mi n a t e t h e mu t u a l s o u r c e o f s t r e n g t h a n d s u p p o r t between political parties and organised labour, and to make it difficult for any potential elected government to intervene on behalf on labour (Kurtz, 1999) .
Structural adjustment and neo-liberal economic policies
Ac c o r d i n g t o t h e r e g i me ' s d e c l a r a t i o n o f p r i n c i p l e s , i t wo u l d s e e k t o ' r e o r g a n i s e t h e e c o n o my , d e s t r o y e d t o i t s v e r y r o o t s b y Ma r x i s m' ( c i t e d i n C o l l i n s a n d L e a r , 1 9 95: 27). Regardless of the official propaganda about the causes, what is certain is that the economy was in crisis (hyperinflation, fiscal deficit, collapse of investment, etc.). In order to stabilise it, the regime introduced measures that included among others, a sizeable cut back of public spending, the end of subsidies and price controls for entire industries and local products, the unilateral reduction of tariff barriers, a substantial increase in interest rates, the reorganisation of taxation, and the grant of privileges to private capital (Arrizabalo-Montoro, 1995; Bronstein, 1997) . In addition, the military decided to cut labour costs by fixing wages below inflation, making cuts in the minimum wage and employment compensation, and facilitating layoffs . I n t h i s wa y , t h e r e g i me ' s e c o n o mi c a d v i s e r s -the so-c a l l e d ' C h i c a g o B o y s ' -IJHRM 8 s t a r t e d t o a d a p t t h e i d e a s o f Ha y e k a n d F r i e d ma n t o t h e r e a l i t i e s o f C h i l e ' s mi l i t a r y d i c t a t o r s h i p , ' g e n e r a t i n g a s p e c i a l b r a n d o f e c o n o mi c n e o -liberalism practised in the politically thoroughly anti-l i b e r a l e n v i r o n me n t o f P i n o c h e t ' s d i c t a t o r s h i p ' ( S z n a j d e r , 1996: 731). Thus, for example, whilst strengthening the role of market forces and the private sector though deregulation and grant of privileges, the state tightly fixed wages and controlled labour activity, placing the burden of the adjustment on the workers (Mesa-Lago, 2000) . As a result wages collapsed, unemployment soared, thousands of manufacturing jobs were lost, companies were closed, entire industries were weakened, and the social security system started to fall apart (Bronstein, 1997; Sznajder, 1996) . Organised labour lost members in the sectors most affected by the adjustment and in those were they had been traditionally most active (manufacturing, public enterprises and services).
After a few years, inflation started to be under control and the macroeconomic success of the adjustment policies encouraged the regime to deepen the structural transformation of the economy in line with neo-liberal ideas (Kurtz, 1999) . Thus, it rejected the previously dominant -and fragile since the 1960s-paradigm of importsubstitution industrialisation 1 by reinstalling a natural-resource-based export-oriented d e v e l o p me n t s t r a t e g y , u n d e r wh i c h ' p r o mo t i o n s o f e x p o r t s b a s e d o n c o mp a r a t i v e adv a n t a g e t r a d e a n d a n o p e n e c o n o my a r e s e e n a s t h e o p t i ma l p a t h t o d e v e l o p me n t ' some of the traditional segments of its productive structure, especially manufacturing, whereas the importance of the service and primary export sectors has grown rapidly ever since 2 . Unions were not able to broaden their bases in the growing primary export sector, frequently associated with low organisational levels.
For Schurman (2001: 5) , workers in these sectors ' we r e p a i d e x t r e me l y l o w wa g e s ,
had no job security, and were subject to working conditions reminiscent of the I n d u s t r i a l R e v o l u t i o n . '
' Au t h o r i t y a n d d i s c i p l i n e ' i n i n d u strial relations: the 1979 Labour Plan
The j u n t a ' s d e c l a r a t i o n o f p r i n c i p l e s s i g n a l l e d i t s ' i n t e n t i o n o f i mp o s i n g a u t h o r i t y a n d d i s c i p l i n e i n p r o d u c t i o n a n d l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s ' ( C o l l i n s a n d L e a r , 1 9 9 5 : 2 7 ) . I n t h e early years of the regime this purpose was accomplished by force: suspending wo r k e r s ' r i g h t s a n d o p e n l y r e p r e s s i n g o r g a n i s e d l a b o u r . B u t a f t e r s i x y e a r s i n t o mi l i t a r y r u l e a n d ma i n l y a s a r e s p o n s e t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e , P i n o c h e t ' s g o v e r n me n t d e c r e e d a n e w l a b o u r c o d e . T h e e n a c t me n t o f t h e ' 1 9 7 9 L a b o u r P l a n '
did not mean however that the regime had abandoned its intention of imposing ' d i s c i p l i n e ' i n i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s , o r t h a t i t h a d d e c i d e d t o g e n u i n e l y r e s t o r e s u s p e n d e d wo r k e r s ' r i g h t s . I n f a c t , t h e ' mo d e r n i s a t i o n ' p r o c e s s wa s h i g h l y dependent on the reduction of labour costs, and hence a principal aim of the code wa s t o r e s t r i c t ' r i g i d i t i e s , s u c h a s l a b o u r r i g h t s a n d l a b o u r ma r k e t p r o t e c t i o n ' (Riethof 1999 (Riethof : 1050 . The new legal framework was carefully designed not only to continue its approach to labour -this time by law-but also to provide for a completely free labour market in line with the neo-liberal rationale.
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Collective labour relations: a market containment strategy for union control
In the area of collective labour relations, the 197 9 L a b o u r P l a n wa s d e s i g n e d ' t o i n s u r e t h a t t h e l a b o u r mo v e me n t wo u l d r e ma i n we a k e n e d a n d f r a g me n t e d ' ( R o b e r t s , 1998: 114). Firstly, as is evident in Table 1 , it restricted the right to organise to the individual enterprise only after a year of business existence, made affiliation to unions voluntary, and permitted several unions within the same workplace. Some large categories of workers were not granted organising rights (public and agricultural sectors, seasonal and temporary workers among others) and it reduced legal protection of union leaders. It banned the existence of national federations (centrales sindicales) and severely restricted the functions of higher-level labour organisations (federations and confederations). Most union functions and activities were subject to detailed regulations and procedures (elections and composition of directorates, financing and management, etc.).
Secondly, the 1979 code decentralised collective bargaining completely by prohibiting it to be conducted at any level but that of the enterprise or workplace.
Several economic activities and unions were excluded. Federations and confederations were not allowed to bargain collectively. Unions were stripped off their exclusive representation rights in collective bargaining and collective contracts ceased to be the exclusive outcome of the latter. On the one hand, one or more wo r k e r s c o u l d f o r m ' b a r g a i n i n g g r o u p s ' ( grupos negociadores) with the sole purpose of bargaining and signing a collective instrument. On the other hand, the code allowed for two modes of collective bargaining, a regulated and a nonr e g u l a t e d o n e , t h a t l e d r e s p e c t i v e l y t o t wo k i n d s o f c o l l e c t i v e a g r e e me n t s : ' c o l l e c t i v e
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c o n t r a c t s ' a n d ' c o l l e c t i v e c o n v e n t i o n s ' ( convenios colectivos) (Montero et al., 1999) .
Whereas regulated collective bargaining took place according to detailed and strict procedures established in legislation and contemplated the right to strike, the nonr e g u l a t e d me t h o d n e i t h e r c o n s i d e r e d p r o c e d u r a l r u l e s n o r ' wa s v e s t e d wi t h e v e n t h e minimal rights (traditionally) associated with collective bargaining such as the right t o s t r i k e ' ( Ha a g h , 2 0 0 2 : 1 0 3 ) . T h e P l a n p r o h i b i t e d t h e e x t e n s i o n o f b o t h t y p e s collective instruments (contracts and conventions) to any employee not involved in bargaining. In addition, it banned a number of matters from collective bargaining restricting it in practice to wages.
Thirdly, the Plan restricted the right to strike by imposing numerous conditions so as to render it ineffective. A strike was only legal as part of a regulated collective bargaining process, that is, the one leading to a collective contract, and solely if no new contract had been signed among other requirements. Their maximum duration could not exceed 60 days, after which strikers were understood to have ' r e s i g n e d
v o l u n t a r i l y ' . T h e e mp l o y e r wa s a l l o we d t o l o c k o u t a n d t o h i r e r e p l a c e me n t s , a n d after 30 days any worker was allowed to resume work and bargain individually.
In this way, the 1979 Labour Plan severely weakened collective labour relations and affe c t e d wo r k e r s ' b a r g a i n i n g p o we r r e f l e c t i n g t h e a d o p t i o n o f a market containment strategy for union control (Valenzuela, 1989) . Authoritarian r e g i me s ' c o n t a i n me n t strategies can be divided into two ideal types: the corporatist and the market. The former involves the creation by the state of some controlled form of worker organisation, whereas the latter tries to weaken unions as bargaining agents.
Ac c o r d i n g t o Va l e n z u e l a ( 1 9 8 9 : 4 5 7 ) , r e g i me s a s t h e C h i l e a n o n e , ' e mp l o y i n g exclusively a market strategy can onl y b e c h a r a c t e r i s e d a s ' s y n d i c a l l y h a r s h ' , s i n c e this approach is single mindedly centred on preventing collective actions from h a v i n g a n e f f e c t o n t h e l a b o u r ma r k e t ' . To complement this the 1979 Labour Plan was designed to provide for a free labour ma r k e t t h a t wo u l d g i v e t h e e c o n o mi c i n c e n t i v e a n d ' l e g a l f l e x i b i l i t y e mp l o y e rs felt wa s n e c e s s a r y t o mo d e r n i s e C h i l e a n i n d u s t r y ' ( C o l l i n s a n d L e a r , 1 9 9 5 ) . As i n d i c a t e d
in Table 2 , the 1979 Labour Plan grant ample discretion to employers in the contracting and deploying of their labour force. First, it encouraged the use of fixedtem contracts and facilitated different kinds of indirect contracting (externalisation, intermediation, subcontracting, outsourcing, seasonal work, etc.). It also increased the number of jobs excluded directly or indirectly from the application of labour legislation (independent workers, some agricultural workers) (Morgado, 1999) .
Second, the Plan flexibilised regulations governing working conditions by repealing p r e v i o u s p r o t e c t i v e l e g i s l a t i o n a n d b y p e r mi t t i n g e mp l o y e r s ' u n i l a t e r a l i s m i n s e v e r a l areas. Third, it gave employers the right to dismiss workers without a just cause but with compensation. However, since the latter was modest and the range of acceptable causes was broad, the code allowed employers in practice to hire and fire workers at will.
The 1 9 7 9 L a b o u r P l a n ' s d e r e g u l a t i o n o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l e mp l o y me n t c o n t r a c t The legacy of the dictatorship for the industrial relations system was significant both Concertación)-brought Patricio Aylwin (1990 Aylwin ( -1993 to power. At this stage, the recovery of democracy seemed to offer the opportunity to overcome the limitations perceived in labour legislation and indeed there were reasons to believe that the industrial relations legal framework was going to be submitted to significant reform.
Firstly, the opposition to Pinochet had bitterly confronted the means and ends of his Du r i n g t h e ' t r a n s i t i o n t o d e mo c r a c y ' l a b o u r r e f o r m has been a major political issue.
The battle to redefine the industrial relations legal framework has proven to be a very contested and ideologically charged process that has been conducted with different degrees of success by the three Concertación adminis t r a t i o n s . Ay l wi n ' s government (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) sought to manage industrial relations through broad tripartite agreements negotiated at the national level among the government, the CUT, and the peak business association, the Confederación de la Producción y el Comercio (henceforth CPC). In this period, three laws were passed concerning the individual employment contract, trade union federations, the right to collective bargaining and the right to strike. Together with a further reform in 1993, negotiated between the government and the CPC, these laws were later consolidated into the ' 1 9 9 4 L a b o u r C o d e ' ( B r o n s t e i n , 1 9 9 7 ) . Under the Frei administration (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) the idea of tripartite agreements was abandoned formally not only by the CPC but also by the CUT. The meagre results achieved, from the perspective of labour, generated considerable tension with the government, and the CUT elected a nonConcertación, Communist leadership. New reforms were proposed in 1997 but although they were the product of government-opposition consensus, the former was unable to get them passed by the conservative Senate majority. In the context of the recession provoked by the Asian crisis and the general slowdown of the world economy, the newly elected government of Socialist Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006) p a s s e d t h e ' 2 0 0 1 L a b o u r R e f o r ms ' i n t e n d i n g t o p u t a n e n d t o t h e ' l a b o u r t r a n s i t i o n '
according to Socialist Minister of Work Ricardo Solari (Sanfuentes, 2000) . In the next section, we present schematically the main labour reforms passed under the
d e mo c r a t i c r e g i me . F o r t h e p u r p o s e s o f t h i s p a p e r , t h e ' T r a n s i t i o n ' s L a b o u r
R e f o r ms ' wi l l r e f e r t o b o t h t h e ' 1 9 9 4 L a b o u r C o d e ' a n d t h e ' 2 0 0 1 L a b o u r R e f o r ms ' .
Between re-regulation and flexibility: the T r a n s i t i o n ' s L a b o u r
Reforms
In order to examin e t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e T r a n s i t i o n ' s L a b o u r R e f o r ms , i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o consider the direction -or type-of the changes in relation to the legislation being reformed. Cook (1998: 317) distinguishes three types of possible changes in her analysis of labour reform in Latin America:
' Flexible laws are those which deregulate the labour market, lower employer costs, and generally grant employers greater manoeuvrability in contracting and deploying IJHRM 17 their labour force in response to market pressures. Liberal or pluralist reforms are those which strengthen the autonomy of unions and employer organisations from the state and which encourage pluralism, as opposed to the monopoly of representation and dependence on the state often found in corporatist systems. Protective changes reinforce or establish protections for workers by stipulating these in legislation rather t h a n l e a v i n g t h e m s u b j e c t t o n e g o t i a t i o n b e t we e n wo r k e r s a n d e mp l o y e r s ' .
In general, one would expect that changes that respond to economic pressures and neo-liberal policies would tend to be consistent with flexible reforms, whereas changes that coincide with the reestablishment of democratic regimes would tend to move in a more pluralist and protective direction (Cook 1998).
In addition, it is needed to take into account the degree -or scope-of the changes.
Burke and Litwin (1989) have distinguished between transformational and transactional degrees of change. Transformational change refers to significant if not fundamental change. Transactional change represents fine-tuning or incremental modifications, which are not significant in scope. Most authors agree with the idea that significant change in a particular industrial relations legal framework tends to occur as a response to significant political or economic shifts. Thus, the significant political change represented by the substitution of a new democratic regime for
P i n o c h e t ' s d i c t a t o r s h i p g a v e r e a s o n t o e x p e c t t r a n s f o r ma t i o n a l r e f o r ms t o l a b o u r
legislation.
T h e T r a n s i t i o n ' s Re f o r ms o f c o l l e c t i v e l a b our relations
IJHRM 18 The reform of collective labour relations under the democratic regime has taken a p l u r a l i s t a n d p r o t e c t i v e d i r e c t i o n . As i t c a n b e o b s e r v e d i n T a b l e 3 , t h e T r a n s i t i o n ' s Labour Reforms have extended the right to organise, to bargain collectively and to strike to previously excluded groups of workers. The requirements to form unions, federations and confederations have been reduced, and the existence of national federations (centrales sindicales) has been permitted. The reforms have allowed coll e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g t o b e c o n d u c t e d b e y o n d t h e f i r m' s l e v e l a n d b r o a d e n e d t h e matters that can be subject of bargaining. In addition, they have set no time limit for s t r i k e s ' d u r a t i o n a n d p r o h i b i t e d i n p r i n c i p l e t h e h i r e o f r e p l a c e me n t s . A c l o s e r l o o k however, shows that despite of their direction, the reforms have not been as significant as they may appear and as asserted by some commentators (Acevedo, 2001; Mesa-Lago, 2000) , but rather modest (Escobar, 1999; Haagh, 2002) . In order to illuminate this point it is helpful to briefly consider some examples of the main reforms of the period.
T h e T r a n s i t i o n ' s L a b o u r R e f o r ms h a v e e n c o u r a g e d a n d e x t e n d e d t h e r i g h t t o organise to several previously excluded groups of workers and sectors of the economy but the extension of this right has not been accompanied in all cases with the rights to collective bargaining and to strike. On the one hand, there are still large categories of workers explicitly excluded from collective bargaining such as those in the public sector. On the other hand, some categories of workers -agricultural seasonal workers for example-have been given bargaining rights but only in their non-regulated form, that is, the one leading to collective conventions that does not provide for information, protection, or strike rights (Dirección del Trabajo, 2001 ).
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Although the right to organise has been widely extended, the incentives for unionisation and maintenance of membership have remained low because collective bargaining has not been strengthened. In fa c t , t h e T r a n s i t i o n ' s L a b o u r R e f o r ms h a v e kept intact the key features of the 1979 Labour Plan that allowed the existence of two competing types of collective bargaining procedures (regulated and nonregulated), instruments (contracts and conventions), and representatives (unions and bargaining groups). It is said that the reforms have strengthened the regulated collective bargaining process by reducing the numerous issues excluded from bargaining stipulated by the 1979 Labour Plan. However, they have left in place the l a t t e r ' s mo s t r e l e v a n t a n d b r o a d l y i n c l u s i v e r e s t r i c t i o n b a n n i n g ' a l l ma t t e r s t h a t ma y r e s t r i c t o r l i mi t t h e e mp l o y e r ' s e x c l u s i v e r i g h t t o o r g a n i s e , l e a d , a n d ma n a g e t h e f i r m, a n d t h o s e e x t e r n a l t o t h e f i r m' ( Di r e c c i ó n d e l T r a b a j o , 2 0 0 3 a ) . I n addition, collective bargaining beyond the enterprise level has been allowed, but only if e mp l o y e r s a g r e e . T h e d e p e n d e n c y o n e mp l o y e r s ' c o n s e n t q u e s t i o n s t h e r e a l significance of this change for the strengthening of collective bargaining.
T h e T r a n s i t i o n ' s Reforms have not succeeded in strengthening the right to strike either, rendering it ineffective in practice. Measures such as the elimination of the ma x i mu m 6 0 d a y s l e n g t h f o r s t r i k e s h a v e b e e n ' c o mp e n s a t e d ' b y r e d u c i n g f r o m 3 0 to 15 days the minimum number of days allowed for individual employees to dissociate themselves from the strike and to negotiate individually. Furthermore, the R e f o r ms c o n c e r n i n g t h e h i r i n g o f s t r i k e r s ' r e p l a c e me n t s h a v e c o me t o b e s e e n a s a 
T h e T r a n s i t i o n ' s Re f o r ms o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l e mp l o y me n t c o n t r a c t
The reform of the legislation governing the individual employment contract has taken a protective direction in most areas whilst maintaining, and sometimes, increasing its already flexible character in others. As is evident in Table 4 , the greater part of the reforms has focused on statutory protections, which have included increases in the minimum wage, extension of maternity protections, maximum working hours governing some occupations, and the creation of an unemployment i n s u r a n c e s y s t e m i n 2 0 0 1 . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e T r a n s 
e c a u s e o f t h e ' n e c e s s i t i e s o f t h e f i r m' ; a wi d e r a n g i n g p r o v i s i o n s i n c ealmost
e v e r y t h i n g c a n b e j u s t i f i e d wi t h t h i s p r e t e x t : ' a n e mp l o y e r c a n t e r mi n a t e a c o n t r a c t o f work using as a cause the necessities of the firm, establishment, or service; such as those deriving from rationalisation, modernisation, falls in productivity, changes in market conditions or in the economy which make it necessary to dismiss one or more wo r k e r s , a n d t h e t e c h n i c a l o r wo r k i n g u n s u i t a b i l i t y o f t h e wo r k e r ' ( a d I n s u mma r y , t h e T r a n s i t i o n ' s L a b o u r R e f o r ms h a v e mo d i f i e d a s p e c t s o f b o t h collective and individual labour relations and taken predominantly a protective, and to lesser extent, pluralist direction (Cook, 1998) . That labour reform has moved in these directions has not meant however that as a result, legislation changed significantly and gained a protective or pluralist character. On the contrary, it can be a r g u e d t h a t s e v e r a l o f t h e mo s t ' s i g n i f i c a n t ' r e f o r ms e n a c t e d d u r i n g t h e t r a n s i t i o n had provisions that meant in practice only incremental change, leaving the character of labour legislation essentially flexible. Whereas the 1979 Labour Plan transformed industrial relations by de-regulating and dismantling the previous protectionist s y s t e m, t h e T r a n s i t i o n ' s L a b o u r R e f o r ms h a v e i mp r o v e d t h e l e v e l o f p r o t e c t i o n r eregulating several areas, but without returning to the earlier situation (Bronstein 1997) . In this way, the current Chilean industrial relations legal framework displays r e ma r k a b l e c o n t i n u i t y wi t h i t s p r e d e c e s s o r a s t h e l a t t e r ' s ma i n f e a t u r e s h a v e remained in place, and the principles upon which it was designed are still valid: a market containment strategy for union control and a neo-liberal model of labour market flexibility.
E x p l a i n i n g t h e d i r e c t i o n a n d d e g r e e o f t h e T r a n s i t i o n ' s
Labour Reforms
Wh y h a v e t h e T r a n s close examination suggests the presence of two broad categories of explanations:
those centred primarily on political considerations and those emphasising mainly economic factors. In the Chilean case, they have focused on the high degree of e mp l o y e r s ' r e s i s t a n c e , t h e b l o c k i n g r o l e o f t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e o p p o s i t i o n , t h e we a k n e s s of the labour movement, the early introduction and continuous commitment of the government to neo-liberal policies, and the good state of the economy (Cook, 1998; Escobar, 1999; Espinosa, 1996; Haagh, 2002; Olave, 1997) . Both politically and economically centred explanations offer valuable insights but none of them on their own is capable of offering a satisfactory account of the problem.
The mutual dependency of both political and economic processes in practice is what gives good reason for a more comprehensive political-economy approach capable of incorporating and strengthening partial explanations. We believe that exploring both processes and the way they have developed under the democratic regime, may help u s i l l u mi n a t e t h e p a r t i c u l a r d i r e c t i o n t a k e n b y , a n d l i mi t e d d e g r e e o f , t h e T r a n s i t i o n ' s Labour Reforms 7 . In what follows, we examine how a conservative transition to democracy legitimated the model of protected democracy instituted by the 1980 Constitution, and with it the neo-liberal development strategy. By continuing the political and economic policies of the dictatorship, the democratic governments found themselves institutionally and structurally constrained from pursuing significant reforms of the labour law. In doing so, they have also contributed to deepen long-term trends in the imbalance of power between capital and labour.
The political dynamics of a conservative transition to democracy IJHRM 24 In attempting to explain the direction and degree of labour reform in Chile during the 1990s, it is necessary to set this process against the background of a conservative transition to democracy and its particular dynamics. At the outset of the democratic regime, the leaders of the Concertación were greatly concerned with the viability of the newly elected government. Indeed, an essential issue regarding transitions is whether they lead to con s o l i d a t e d d e mo c r a c y . I n wo r d s o f P r z e wo r s k i ( 1 9 9 1 : 3 7 ) , ' a breakdown of an authoritarian regime may be reversed, or it may lead to a new dictatorship. And even if a democracy is established, it need not to be selfsustaining; the democratic institutions may systematically generate outcomes that c a u s e s o me p o l i t i c a l l y i mp o r t a n t f o r c e s t o s u b v e r t t h e m' . T h e Concertación felt the potential for a return to authoritarianism was high and gave the highest priority to the objective of democratic stability and consolidation.
In doing so, it favoured a pacted and elite-led type of transition. A pacted transition ' wi t h i t s a wk wa r d n a me d e r i v e d f r o m t h e S p a n i s h c a s e ( transición pactada)
concerns the establishment of democratic rule within the institutional framework of a p r e v i o u s a u t h o r i t a r i a n r e g i me ' ( Wi l d e , 1 9 9 9 : 4 7 8 ) . T h e n e w g o v e r n me n t a c c e p t e d t h e d i c t a t o r s h i p ' s i n s t i t u t i o n a l f r a me wo r k -a n d wi t h i t t h e mo d e l o f ' p r o t e c t e d d e mo c r a c y ' i n s t i t u t e d b y t h e 1 9 8 0 C o n s t i t u t i o n -by participating in the 1988
Plebiscite. It was firmly believed that defeating the regime within its own set of rules would help secure the results in the event of victory at the ballot box. In addition, democratic elites sought political stability by exerting tight control over the transition process since, as Karl (1990 in Roberts, 1998 has asserted,
' d e mo c r a t i c s t a b i l i t y i s mo r e l i k e l y , a t l e a s t i n t h e s h o r t t e r m, wh e n e l i t e s r a t h e r t h a n masses are ascendant during the process of transition, and when they define the IJHRM 25 parameters of political and economic change through negotiated political pacts rather
t h a n t h e f o r c e f u l i mp o s i t i o n o f a n y s i n g l e a c t o r ' s p o l i t i c a l p r o j e c t ' .
The delicate political dynamics associated with this conservative mode of transition severely weakened the push for democratisation, preserving the bulk of the authoritarian legacy and conditioning in turn the possibilities of systemic change and significant labour reform. In accomplishing democratic stability and consolidation, the Concertación had to achieve a fragile balance between mitigating the threats and fears of a defeated but unusually strong opposition, and the containment of its own s u p p o r t e r s ' d e ma n d s f o r c h a n g e . T h u s , b o t h t h e a l l i a n c e a n d o r g a n i s 
Ameliorating elite opposition
Although defeated in the electoral arena, the opposition to the democratic government was, and has remained, ideologically cohesive, economically powerful, and politically disciplined. It congregates the great majority of the economic and political right, as well as ample sectors of the military and the media, all of which share having been part or active supporters of the military regime. The immense political and economic power amassed during authoritarianism granted the opposition enough power to block, or to threaten with a backlash, any major attempt IJHRM 26 to systemic reform. One of the ways in which the democratic government sought to mitigate the fears of the opposition, was by accepting most of the institutional ' p r o t e c t i o n s ' a g a i n s t t h e e x e r c i s e o f p o p u l a r s o v e r e i g n t y s t i p u l a t e d i n the 1980
Constitution. Despite the fact that, as part of the process of pacted transition, a package of more than 50 constitutional reforms was negotiated and ratified later in a p l e b i s c i t e i n 1 9 8 9 , s e v e r a l ' a u t h o r i t a r i a n e n c l a v e s ' r e ma i n e d i n p l a c e 8 . The most r e l e v a n t o f t h e e n c l a v e s l e f t we r e t h e r e g i me ' s r i g h t t o d e s i g n a t e n i n e l i f e -time senators (one-fifth of the Senate), and a binominal electoral system that has overrepresented the right, while de facto excluding the Communist Party and other leftist forces outside the Concertación ( Wi l d e , 1 9 9 9 ; R o b e r t s , 1 9 9
) . T h e ' p r o t e c t e d d e mo c r a c y ' mo d e l h a s p r o v e d t o b e h i g h l y e f f e c t i v e i n p r e v e n t i n g a n y a t t e mp t t o
significant labour reform. An artificially strengthened and politically disciplined right controlled the Senate for most of the past decade with an average of only 35 percent of the popular vote, and it used its veto power to prevent any major reform of
P i n o c h e t ' s l e g a c y
9 .
An additional way of ameliorating opposition to the newly elected government, was t h e l a t t e r ' s c a p a c i t y t o a p p e a s e t h e b u s i n e s s s e c t o r , wh o s e c a p a c i t y a n d p r i n c i p l e d
inclination to resist most changes in labour legislation has been considered a major obstacle for significant reform 10 .
The C o n c e r t a c i ó n ' sencouragement of tripartite ' c o n s e n s u s b u i l d i n g ' n e g o t i a t i o n s d i d n o t o n l y ma k e e x p l i c i t i t s pacted elite-led
approach, but sought to show restraint regarding reforms that could potentially threaten the democratic stability as the labour ones. In addition, moderation of demands was considered the only way of achieving concessions from employers and the opposition since the Concertación did not have the majority in the Senate. After IJHRM 27 a short period of dialogue in late 1989 and early 1990 however, the CPC chose a more hard-line leadership which resisted most reforms of the labour code and d e d i c a t e d i t s e l f t o t h e d e f e n c e o f P i n o c h e t ' s e c o n o mi c l e g a c y a b a n d o n i n g de facto the whole idea of a social pact (Roberts, 1998) . Haagh (2002: 94) has shown how employers have remained political actors and o p p o s e d ' l e g a l r e f o r m o f t h e P i n o c h e t code not by remaining outside the political process, but by defending the essence of the existing legislation, piece by piece, using the powerful tool of neoclassical d o c t r i n e ' .
Containing demands
Simultaneously, both the government and the labour movement had to contain the demands of its rank-and-file. In the beginning of the transition process, democratic
s t a b i l i t y s e e me d t o b e h e a v i l y d e p e n d e n t o n t h e s u c c e s s f u l c o n t a i n me n t o f ' l o we r -
class challenges to the social h i e r a r c h y ' ( R o b e r t s , 1 9 9 8 ) . As Valenzuela (1989: 450) has observed, reactions of the labour movement in periods of redemocratisation may provide the pretext for a backlash by hard-line forces that still retain portions of state power:
' a c o mb i n a t i o n o f h igh labour and popular mobilisation at certain critical moments of breakdown of the authoritarian institutions (that is, when the option for a course of redemocratisation becomes possible but state elites have not yet committed themselves to it), followed by the decline of that mobilisation and by the willingness and capacity o f t h e l a b o u r mo v e me n t s ' u n i o n a n d p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p s t o s h o w r e s t r a i n t wh e n t h e political agenda shifts in favour of re-democratisation, would seem to provide the
IJHRM 28 ideal mix in terms o f l a b o u r ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n t o e n s u r i n g t h e l a t t e r ' s s u c c e s s '
(Valenzuela, 1989: 450).
T h e ' mo b i l i s a t i o n -r e s t r a i n t ' s e q u e n c e wa s c l e a r l y o b s e r v a b l e i n Chile. Due to its close ties with the Concertación, the CUT gave priority to the objective of democratic stability and consolidation and showed restraint after the end of military rule so as to facilitate the transition 11 . Organised labour sensed that commitment to dialogue and social peace would bring democratic stability and significant changes in the labour law and consequently it made substantial efforts to demobilise.
Ne v e r t h e l e s s , t h e C UT ' s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t r i p a r t i t e a c c o r d s r e s u l t e d i n me a g r e r e s u l t s
since few concessions were obtained from employers and the right. Furthermore, even if demobilisation was useful for democratic stability -which is open to question-it had the opposite effect for the process of labour reform. Demobilisation strategies detached the CUT from the rank-and-file and they could not revert to mobilisation when dialogue was abandoned.
The political dynamics of a conservative transition are useful in describing the political process that resulted in the early labour reforms (1994 Labour Code).
However, the scenario that led to the 2001 Labour Reforms was different in several respects. In the context of a major economic slowdown, the Lagos administration achieved for the Concertación a small majority in the Senate for the first time since the recovery of democracy. Yet the alliance had already started to show signs of exhaustion and it divided precisely over the issue of labour reform. A sizeable part of the Christian Democracy united with the opposition in blocking significant changes a n d k e e p i n g i n p l a c e s o me o f t h e mo s t e mb l e ma t i c 1 9 7 9 l e g i s l a t i o n s u c h a s s t r i k e r s '
replacements. It was argued that this had to do with the imperative of flexibility for a sizeable part of the government and the opposition over the economic model has prevented significant labour reform since the beginning, but since the Concertación gained the Senate, this has become even more evident.
In summary, whilst the push for democratisation may explain the direction of labour reform, the nature of the process of transition seems to account for its depth.
Reforms that restored and protected basic labour rights stem from the redemocratisation impulse. Their incremental nature however has been a consequence of a conservative transition, which weakened the push for
d e mo c r a t i s a t i o n a n d c o n t r i b u t e d t o s t a b i l i s e a n e f f e c t i v e ' p r o t e c t e d d e mo c r a c y '
system.
Continuity in the economic model and development strategy
Perhaps continuity in the economic model was the most viable way to alleviate the concerns of employers and conservative sectors and induce their political and economic co-operation with the democratic government. Thus, in the onset of the
democratic transition the Concertación ' s o f t e n e d i t s o p p o s i t i on to the neo-liberal
mo d e l a n d b a c k e d a wa y f r o m a n y p l a n f o r a r a d i c a l c h a n g e i n C h i l e ' s d e v e l o p me n t t r a j e c t o r y ' ( R o b e r t s , 1 9 9 8 : 1 4 6 ) . Wh a t r e p r e s e n t e d a s i g n i f i c a n t c o n c e s s i o n t o t h e opposition in the political arena reflected also a high sense of opportunism and pragmatism in the economy. In the context of strong macro economic indicators (rapid economic growth, low inflation, and declining unemployment), the IJHRM 30 government had no intention of introducing radical changes to the development
model. Most importa n t , h o we v e r , wa s t h e i d e o l o g i c a l ' e v o l u t i o n ' o f i mp o r t a n t
sectors of the Concertación -e s p e c i a l l y t h a t r e p r e s e n t e d b y t h e ' r e n o v a t e d ' S o c i a l i s t Party (Munck, 2000)-that had already began to converge in some fundamental aspects with the neo-liberal economic thinking (Collins and Lear, 1995) . As a result,
a n e c o n o mi c mo d e l o r i g i n a l l y a s s o c i a t e d wi t h P i n o c h e t ' s d i c t a t o r s h i p c a me t o b e
reproduced and legitimised by its previous opponents.
The continuation of the neo-liberal development strategy constrained the prospects of significant labour reform. Kuruvilla (1996) argues that significant industrial relations changes depend on significant structural reforms in the economy and, in particular, on development strategy shifts. The 1979 Labour Plan responded to deep structural reforms and consequently it meant a transformation of the industrial r e l a t i o n s s y s t e m. I n c o n t r a s t , t h e T r a n s i t i o n ' s L a b o u r R e f o r ms h a v e r e s u l t e d i n incremental changes, which from this perspective is not surprising since they have not responded to any major change in development strategy. Nevertheless, the confirmation of the economic model by the democratic governments helps to explain the direction of most labour reforms. In fact, the claim that there are close links between development strategy shifts and changes in industrial relations systems does not mean that a certain development strategy is associated with a particular kind of industrial relations system. In other words, what development strategies entail are common objectives but not necessarily common practices. Therefore, variables such as political shifts can make a difference in the way the economy in general and industrial relations systems in particular is carried out within the same development strategy. In the Chilean case, although a conservative transition reduced the IJHRM 31 significance of the push for democratisation, the presence of a democratic regime e x p l a i n s i n p a r t t h e p l u r a l i s t a
n d p r o t e c t i v e d i r e c t i o n o f t h e T r a n s i t i o n ' s L a b o u r
Reforms. In addition, the continuation of the economic model confirmed the push for marketisation set in motion under military rule and seems to account for the preservation of most of the flexible features of the authoritarian labour legislation.
' Gr o wt h wi t h e q u i t y '
Under different labels, the three Concertación administrations have consistently
d e f i n e d t h e i r e c o n o mi c a n d s o c i a l s t r a t e g y a s ' g r o wt h wi t h e q u i t y ' . Wh e r e a s t h e
principle of growth advances the maintenance of the economic model, the principle of equity refers to the simultaneous moderat i o n o f t h e l a t t e r ' s n e g a t i v e e f f e c t s .
Ac c o r d i n g t o Ay l wi n ' s Mi n i s t e r o f P l a n n i n g ( c i t e d i n R i e t h o f 1 9 9 9 : 1 0 5 0 ) , t h i s s t r a t e g y a s s u me s t h a t ' f i r s t , i n c r e a s e s i n s o c i a l s p e n d i n g d e p e n d o n e c o n o mi c
growth, and second, poverty is not related to the structural characteristics of the economy, and therefore, the role of social policy is to moderate the negative effects
f o r t h e p o o r ( …) a n d n o t l e a d t o t h e t r a n s f o r ma t i o n o f t h e s t a t i c f a c t o r s o f t h e s t r u c t u r a l o r d e r ' . L a b o u r l e g i s l a t i o n h a s b e e n a t t h e h e a r t o f t h is equation and, for
some commentators, the corresponding challenge for the government has been how to achieve a balance between worker protection and labour market flexibility (Sanfuentes, 2000) .
On t h e o n e h a n d , a c c o r d i n g t o Ay l wi n ' s Mi n i s t e r o f Wo r k R e né Cortázar (1996) , the p r i n c i p l e o f e q u i t y wa s t r a n s l a t e
d i n t o l a b o u r p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s a s ' e q u i t y , s o c i a l a u t o n o my a n d p a r t i c i p a t i o n ' . Ho we v e r , a c o n s e r v a t i v e t r a n s i t i o n r e s t r i c t e d t h e d e p t h IJHRM 32
of pluralist reforms that would have otherwise effectively encouraged social autonomy and participation. Labour policy objectives focused on equity, narrowly understood as the moderation of the negative effects of the model, which helps to explain the predominantly protective direction of the Transition Labour Reforms.
The same can be said about the pluralist reforms that restored basic labour rights. On t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e p r i n c i p l e o f g r o wt h wa s i n t e r p r e t e d a s ' e f f i c i e n c y o f d e v e l o p me n t ' f o r t h e e f f e c t s o f l a b o u r r e f o r m ( C o r t á z a r , 1 9 9 6 ) . T h e ' e f f i c i e n t ' s i d e of development overtly acknowledged the perceived importance of a flexible labour market in achieving economic growth. Indeed, flexibility with recourse to the external labour market has been considered crucial in keeping labour costs under control, which in turn seems to account for the conservation of the flexible character of the authoritarian legislation 12 .
The democratic governments have achieved significant economic growth and reduced the social deficit inherited from military rule. Between 1990 and 1997, the economy grew at an average level of 7 percent and the levels of poverty halved.
Nevertheless, the worsening of income distribution, the exhaustion of natural resources, and the high vulnerability to external economic shocks, have allowed
commentators to cast doubts about the long-t e r m v i a b i l i t y o f t h e c o u n t r y ' s d e v e l o p me n t s t r a t e g y . F u r t h e r mo r e , s o me a u t h o r s h a v e d o u b t e d t h e ' p r o t e c t i v e '
e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f t h e ' g r o wt h wi t h e q u i t y ' s t r a t e g y . R e f e r r i n g p a r t i c u l a r l y t o wo r k e r s employed in the export sectors, Sch u r ma n ( 2 0 0 1 : 1 7 ) h a s a r g u e d t h a t ' t h e ma i n source of improvement in wages and working conditions (has been) economic rather t h a n p o l i t i c a l o r i n s t i t u t i o n a l ' . I n p r i n c i p l e , t h e d e mo c r a t i c g o v e r n me n t s wi s h t o c r a f t policy incentives that will channel investment toward higher value-added products IJHRM 33
wi t h g r e a t e r l e v e l s o f p r o c e s s i n g t o ma k e C h i l e ' s e c o n o mi c e x p a n s i o n mo r e s u s t a i n a b l e a n d l e s s d e p e n d e n t o n p r i ma r y e x p o r t s
. Al t h o u g h s o me ' i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n '
has been achieved in the primary export sectors (Schurman, 2001) , there is strong evidence that little fundamental changes have been accomplished in the composition of exports and imports during the Concertación administrations (Calcagno and Calcagno, 2000) .
By setting its socio-economic room of manoeuvre within the bounds of the inherited neo-liberal development strategy, the government has acknowledged the difficult task of balancing worker protection and labour market flexibility. Whilst the reforms concerning the former emanate from the push for democratisation, the latter have been the consequence of pressures for marketisation. The limited degree of labour law change shows the importance given to market pressures, which constrains in turn the prospects for further revisions especially regarding private sector industrial relations.
Hegemony versus fragmentation: the increasing (in)balance of power between labour and capital
T h e d i r e c t i o n a n d d e g r e e o f t h e T r a n s i t i o n ' s L a b o u r R e f o r ms c a n n o t b e a t t r i b u t e d solely to macro political and economic considerations. Furthermore, the current state of Chilean industrial relations cannot be seen as a pure consequence of legislation.
Indeed, legal frameworks are built and reformed under the pressure of social actors and according to the actual correlation of forces between them (Montero et al., 1999) . Thus, political and economic accounts are to an important degree conditioned IJHRM 34 by power relations. Under the democratic regime, long-term trends in the balance of power between labour and capital have been deepened. In a diametrically contrasting but mutually reinforcing process, employers have strengthened their political, economic, and social position, whilst that of the workers has been weakened.
R o b e r t s ( 1 9 9 8 : 1 2 6 ) a r g u e s t h a t o r g a n i s e d l a b o u r ' s ' o r g a n i c t i e s t o p o l i t i c a l parties and the state have loosened, its access to the policy making has been narrowed, its organisational and political leverage has been diluted, and their ability to speak for a p l u r a l i t y o f i n t e r e s t s h a s d i mi n i s h e d ' . T h e C h i l e a n l a b o u r f o r c e p r e s e n t s a decreasing degree of associability and an increasing degree of fragmentation, that have been seen both as cause and consequence of the weakness of the labour movement (Campero, 1999; Cook, 1998; Espinosa, 1996; Roberts, 1998) . The rearticulation and strengthening of organised labour in the early re-democratisation process proved to be an illusory one. Union membership post-coup peaked at 15 percent of the employed labour force in 1991 (Table 5) Labour Plan, which suggests that the process of fragmentation will continue further.
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Moreover, at the same time that new unions have been established, others have gone i n t o ' r e c e s s ' 13 . Montero et al. (1999) In contrast, capital has been strengthened significantly. Whilst fragmenting the labour force, the neo-liberal model has concentrated capital in the hands of large business and financial groups (Fazio, 1997) . This paradoxical effect has been intensified further by the systematic reduction of the size of the state. The extensive privatisations and rationalisations of public services and enterprises that benefited economic groups 14 dismantled also institutions that had offered the most vulnerable population a certain degree of social protection. The extension of these changes has b e e n s i g n i f i c a n t . Wh i l s t i n t h e e a r l y 1 9 7 0 s , ' t h e s t a t e a c c o u n t e d f o r 7 5 p e r c e n t o f i n v e s t me n t ( …) , t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r n o w a c c o u n t s f o r 7 5 p e r c e n t ' ( R o b e r t s 1 9 9 8 : 121). Furthermore, capital concentration has increased at a faster rate than GDP, and today less than 2 percent of all companies account for about 75 percent of all sales.
In explaining the limited significance of labour reform, several authors focus on the weakness of the Chilean labour movement. Cook (1998), for example, has described 1 2 ) , t h e o u t c o me o f t h e s e p r e s s u r e s ' ( …) h a s n o t b e e n t o e s t a b l i s h a n i mp e r s o n a l economic regime but rather to reconfigure the balance of social (and class) forces.
" De r e g u l a t i o n " a c t u a l l y c o n s e c r a t e s n e w r u l e s : i n t e n s i f y i n g t h e l a w o f v a l u e , wi t h effects, which empower some economic actors while disempowering others (the ma j o r i t y ) ' . 1973, 
Conclusions
Ac c o r d i n g t o Wi l d e ( 1 9 9 9 : 4 7 6 ) ' wh e n a s s e s s e d a g a i n s t t h e d i v e r s e t r a n s i t i o n s t o democracy throughout the contemporary world, Chile is widely and correctly In attempting to explain the d i r e c t i o n a n d d e g r e e o f t h e T r a n s i t i o n ' s Labour Reforms we have argued for the importance of political-economy approaches. Our analysis has focused on both political and economic processes and the way they have Cortázar, 1996) .
12 Keeping labour costs under control is crucial for an economy competing principally in commodity markets. For example, Petras et al. (in Mesa-Lago 2000) explain the demobilisation strategies of the early transition in these grounds when asserting that the government dismantled popular mobilisation mainly in order to achieve better export competitiveness.
13 According to the Chilean legislation, a union can be valid or dissolved. The former means t h a t a u n i o n h a s l e g a l e x i s t e n c e b u t t h i s c a n b e ' a c t i v e ' o r ' i n r e c e s s ' . A v a l i d
and active organisation has a registered membership and directorate whilst a union in recess lacks both (Montero et al., 1999) .
14 S o me a u t h o r s a r g u e f o r a t r u l y ' e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l P i n o c h e t i s t n e t wo r k ' t h a t b e n e f i t e d from obscure privatisation processes giving rise to powerful economic groups (Mönkeberg, 2001) .  P a r t y t i c k e t s ' e l i mi n a t e d .  National, inter-sectorial, and inter-occupational federations (centrales sindicales) prohibited.  Multiple affiliation to federations (federaciones sindicales) and confederations (confederaciones sindicales) prohibited.  No unions allowed in the first year of a business existence.  No organising rights in the public sector.  No organising rights for workers employed in the agricultural sector; in the newly privatised pensions and health systems; and employed for less than six consecutive months.  Minimum number of workers to form a union. Firms with more than 25 workers: 25 workers and 10% of all workers. Firms with less than 25 workers: 8 workers and 50% of all workers.  Reduction of legal protection of union leaders.  F i n a n c i n g o f u n i o n s mu s t c o me e x c l u s i v e l y a s ' v o l u n t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n s ' f r o m a f f i l i a t e d wo r k e r s .  Check off system prohibited.
Collective bargaining
 Enterprise-level collective bargaining.  Federations and confederations are not allowed to bargain.  Collective bargaining forbidden in the first year of a business existence.  No bargaining rights in the public sector.  No bargaining rights for workers employed in the agricultural sector; in the newly privatised pensions and health systems; for less than six consecutive months.  Nu me r o u s i s s u e s e x c l u d e d f r o m b a r g a i n i n g i n c l u d i n g ' a l l ma t t e r s t h a t ma y r e s t r i c t o r l i mi t t h e e mp l o y e r ' s e x c l u s i v e r i g h t t o o r g a n i s e , l e a d , a n d manage the firm, and those external to the f i r m' . C o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g r e s t r i c t e d t o wa g e s .  Elimination of the floor (piso) for negotiated wages that guaranteed that wages could not be negotiated downward.  Unions are not the exclusive bargaining representatives of workers. Two or more workers can f o r m ' b a r g a i n i n g g r o u p s ' wh i c h a r e a l l o we d t o b a r g a i n a n d s i g n ' c o l l e c t i v e c o n v e n t i o n s ' .  C o l l e c t i v e c o n t r a c t s a r e n o t t h e e x c l u s i v e o u t c o me o f c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g . ' C o l l e c t i v e c o n v e n t i o n s ' ( convenios colectivos) can be signed by unions or bargaining groups in a non-regulated process that does not allow for the right to strike and other elemental bargaining rights.  Limits the application of collective bargaining to those workers involved in negotiations. Prohibits the extension of collective agreements to non-union workers.  Minimum duration for collective contracts and conventions: 2 years.  If no contract is agreed it is decided on a ' f i n a l o f f e r s e l e c t i o n ' b a s e d c o mp u l s o r y a r b i t r a t i o n .
Right to strike
 Strikes are legal only as part of the collective bargaining process leading to collective contract.  Strikes restricted to a single workplace.  S t r i k e s l i mi t e d t o a ma x i mu m o f 6 0 d a y s , a f t e r wh i c h wo r k e r s c o u l d b e d i s mi s s e d wi t h o u t c o mp e n s a t i o n ( ' v o l u n t a r y r e s i g n a t i o n ' ) .  Striking workers entitled to individually dissociating themselves from the strike and to negotiate individually after 30 days.  E mp l o y e r ' s l o c k o u t a n d s t r i k e r s ' r e p l a c e me n t p e r mi t t e d .  The President of the Republic could decree a strike illegal if it was deemed to be a threat to National Security, the economy, and/or the wellbeing of the population.
Sources: adapted from Bronstein, 1997; Collins and Lear, 1995; Cook, 1998; Mesa-Lago, 2000; Morgado,1999. IJHRM 45 Hiring  Fixed-term employment contract for a period up to two consecutive years.  New contractual framework for children, apprentices, agricultural, and home workers.  Excludes independent workers from the application of labour legislation.  Eliminates the regulation of homework.
Working conditions
 Working hours calculated on an individual basis within the limits of a 48-hour week allowing broad flexibility to plan daily work timetable.  Employer authorised to modify up to 60 minutes of the agreed daily work time distribution.  Repealed regulations governing more favourable working hours applicable in certain specific sectors.  Permitted children less than 16 years of age to undertake night work in certain industries.  Extended exceptions to Sunday rest and legal holidays.  Abolished differentiated minimum salaries for blue-collar workers and minimum wages for white-collar employees. Instead established a national minimum wage and set its value at the level of the former minimum salary.  Minimum wage not applicable to workers under 21 and over 65 years of age.  Allowed salaries lower than minimum wage for apprentices, agricultural, and home workers.  Employer authorised to alter the nature and location of the services provided by the enterprise.  Employer allowed to determine when workers can take their annual leave.
Dismissal
 Freedom to lay off workers without a just cause but with compensation.  C o mp e n s a t i o n : o n e mo n t h ' s s a l a r y f o r e a c h y e a r wo r k e d f o r t h e s a me e mp l o y e r , u p t o a ma x i mu m o f f i v e mo n t h s .  Range of causes that do not allow for compensation. Political and National Security causes included.  Duty to reinstate unfairly dismissed workers abolished.  Abolished norms that required authorisation for collective dismissals (more than ten workers in a month).
Sources: adapted from Bronstein, 1997; Collins and Lear, 1995; Cook, 1998; Mesa-Lago, 2000; Morgado,1999. IJHRM 46 Sindicales) .  Reduced requirements to form federations (minimum of three unions) and confederations (minimum of five federations).  Allowed to organise unions in the first year of a business existence.  Extended right to organise to the public sector with exclusions.  Extended right to organise to workers employed in the agricultural sector; in the newly privatised pensions and health systems; and employed for less than six consecutive months.  Reduced minimum number of workers required to form a union.
Firms with more than 50 workers: 25 workers and 10% of all workers. Firms with less than 50 workers: 8 workers and 50% of all workers.  Granted protection to union leaders, prohibiting their dismissal without approval by a labour court.  E s t a b l i s h e d n e w r u l e s a n d i n c r e a s e d s a n c t i o n s f o r e mp l o y e r s ' u n f a i r labour practices and facilitated access to labour courts.  Facilitates check off system.  Reduced further requirements to form confederations (minimum of three federations).  Extended right to organise to previously excluded public enterprises dependent from the Defence Ministry.  Established a promotional norm in firms with less than 50 workers allowing 8 workers to form a union and to complete the minimum requirement within one year.  R e i n f o r c e s L a b o u r Of f i c e ' s ( Inspeccion del Trabajo) attributions regarding unfair labour practices.  Unfairly dismissed workers for unfair labour practices allowed to choose between reinstatement or compensation.
Collective bargaining Collective bargaining
 Voluntary collective bargaining beyond enterprise level permitted if employers agree.  Allowed federations and confederations to bargaining collectively if employers agree.  No bargaining rights for public sector workers.  No bargaining rights for agricultural workers.  Issues excluded from bargaining reduced but maintained the clause about ' a l l ma t t e r s t h a t ma y r e s t r i c t o r l i mi t t h e e mp l o y e r ' s e x c l u s i v e right to organise, lead, and manage the firm, and those external to t h e f i r m' .  If benefits gained in a contract by the union are extended by the employer to non-union members, the latter must pay 75% of union contributions throughout the duration of the contract.  Introduced free mediation procedures.
 Employer must prov i d e t h e u n i o n wi t h i n f o r ma t i o n a b o u t t h e f i r m' s
financial situation and labour costs.  Introduced some procedural regulations to collective conventions.  Allowed agricultural seasonal workers to bargain collectively and to sign conventions.  Modified duration of collective contracts and conventions.
Minimum: two years and maximum: four years.
Right to strike Right to strike
 Revoked the maximum of 60 days for strikes and set no time limit for their duration.  Striking workers entitled to individually dissociating themselves from the strike and to negotiate individually after 15 days.  Strikes can be automatically called off after 50% of striking workers returned to work.  Striker replacement permitted from day one of the strike if employer complies with certain conditions.
 Striker replacement prohibited in principle unless employer does not comply with certain conditions. Among them, compensation payment to the union.
Sources: adapted from Bronstein, 1997; Cook, 1998; Mesa-Lago, 2000; Morgado, 1999; Dirección del Trabajo, 2001 and 2003a. IJHRM 47
T a b l e 4 . Ma i n T r a n s i t i o n ' s L a b o u r Re f o r ms : I n d i v i d u a l E mp l o y me n t Co n t r a c t .
Labour Code 2001 Labour Reform
Hiring Hiring  Fixed-term employment contract maximum duration reduced to one year.  If work continues after fixed-term contract concludes, indefinite contract becomes due automatically.  Indefinite contract automatically replaces fixed-term contract after second renovation.  Workers employed discontinuously for twelve months over a 15-month period entitled to indefinite contract.  Establishes a range of fixed-term employment contracts where benefits, wages, and conditions are lower than those provided to ' n o r ma l ' e mp l o y e e s .
 Added new forms of employment: E-work (teletrabajo) and Training Contract for Youths up to 24 years of age.  Extended full-time employment rights to part-time workers (no more than 2/3 of normal working day).
Working conditions Working conditions
 Extension of the 48-hour week to the hotel and catering trade.  Maximum working hours and minimum rest periods for commerce, transportation, and fishing workers.  Night-time work prohibited for children under 18 years of age.  Workers entitled to a minimum of one Sunday a month.  Increased national minimum wage.  Introduced a national minimum wage for workers 65 years of age or older.  Increased family allowances, minimum pensions, and family subsides.  C r e a t e d p a i d l e a v e s f o r b i r t h o r d e a t h o f a wo r k e r ' s c h i l d a n d d e a t h of a spouse.  Extended maternity protections and improved working conditions for women.  Extended family obligations and rights to male workers.  Compulsory internal rules and procedures for firms employing more than 25 workers.  Ma t t e r s r e l a t e d t o h e a l t h a n d h y g i e n e mu s t b e p a r t o f t h e f i r m' s internal rules and procedures.  Employers must provide for adequate safety and hygiene working conditions.  Universalised the right to paid vacations to all workers.  I n c r e a s e d s a n c t i o n s f o r e mp l o y e r s ' l a b o u r v i o l a t i o n s a n d f a c i l i t a t e d wo r k e r ' s a c c e s s t o l a b o u r c o u r t s .
 Reduces the working week from 48 to 45 hours distributed in five days (from 2005).  Hotel and catering trade exempted of the reduced 45-hour week.  Especial working-time arrangements must be authorised by the Labour Office (Inspeccion del Trabajo). It requires the previous agreement between the employers and workers.  Workers entitled to a minimum of two Sundays a month.  Established a compulsory unemployment insurance system financed by the employer and the worker.  All firms employing more than 10 workers must have a internal regulations.  Employers must provide for food, shelter and transportation for seasonal agricultural workers when working far away.  Employers must provide for day care facilities for children of seasonal agricultural workers.
Dismissal Dismissal
 Discretionary dismissal replaced by statement of cause with exceptions (managers and home workers).  I n c r e a s e d t h e ma x i mu m c o mp e n s a t i o n t o o n e mo n t h ' s s a l a r y f o r each year worked for the same employer, up to a maximum of eleven months, for contracts started after 1981.  Incorporate s t h e ' n e c e s s i t i e s o f t h e e n t e r p r i s e ' a s j u s t c a u s e f o r dismissal.  Eliminates political and National Security as causes that do not allow for compensation.  Workers dismissed without a cause granted the right to appeal to labour courts  Unfair dismissal compensation equal to 120% of compensation.
 E l i mi n a t e s t h e ' t e c h n i c a l o r wo r k i n g u n s u i t a b i l i t y o f t h e wo r k e r ' a s a just cause for dismissal.  Causes that do not allow for compensation can only be those related to the job. Al l e n d e ' s g o v e r n me n t l a s t e d f o r t h r e e y e a r s b e t we e n 1 9 7 0 a n d 1 9 7 3 . 2 : Not reliable statistics for period 1974-1979. 3 Sources: adapted from Dirección del Trabajo, 2003b; INE, 2001; and Roberts, 1998. IJHRM 49 
